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INTRODUCTION: OF OPTICAL TECHNOLOGIES, VIRTUAL REALITY, AND THE BODY


This paper discusses the phenomenology of the body in Virtual Reality (VR). VR denotes the use of 3-D computer graphics technology to generate artificial environments that afford real-time interaction and exploration. The development of this, still relatively new, technology continues to evolve to further heights of psychological, sensorial, and bodily immersion. The distinction between sensorial and bodily immersion is mainly a practical one. 'Sensorial', as used here, refers to properties of the senses (to be able to see, hear, and touch in the virtual environment), while 'bodily immersion' refers to the (re)presentation of bodily parts in the virtual environment. [1]

Vision, the most privileged of the senses, continues to play a principal role in the habitation of this cyberspace, 'inputting' our gaze and transforming our intentionality. [2] We might wonder why VR has been, and largely remains, an optical technology. In many ways it could be argued that vision is (technically) the least problematic of the senses to 'input' into the computer environment. However, it is also true that vision has long been regarded as the finest of the senses (seeing is believing). Still, another persuasive influence has been the insights (in-sight) that science has gained from optical technologies (Don Ihde, 1990), such as the microscope and the telescope, which reinforce the view that the acquisition of knowledge is primarily a visual enterprise. It is these elements which facilitate a dominant eye in VR.

It is a more recent recognition that vision by itself is incomplete [3] that has prompted the development of peripherals to capture and project the body in all its complexity into the 'terminal reality' (Scott Bukatman, 1993) that is VR. Virtual Reality is no longer solely characterised by a 'disembodied' gaze, a projection of our selves into an optic panorama. The technical principles of the familiar data glove (a lightweight Lycra glove fitted with optical fibres along the backs of the fingers) have been adapted to a fully instrumented body suit, a Lycra cat suit fitted with flexible sensors to capture and render joint positions and movement. Such apparatus enables the animation of a virtual body viewable via a head-mounted visual display (Stephen Ellis, 1995). [4] Indeed, a ‘compelling’ VR experience is created by ‘blocking’ sensory impressions from physical reality (Frank Biocca and Mark Levy, 1995). The eyes, possibly the ears, hand, and whole body, are ‘covered’ by VR peripherals. Reminiscent of procedures associated with sensory deprivation, it is, in fact, a substitution of sensory information. [5] From the data glove to the body suit, VR technologies are becoming all embodying, perhaps even re-embodying; they are becoming what Anne Balsamo (1995) calls ‘new technologies of corporeality’ (p.215).

The predominantly visual characteristic of VR (which is why it can be considered an optical technology) has facilitated neo-Cartesian readings of computer (dis)embodiment. [6] The body, the story goes, remains docked, immobile at the interface, while the mind wanders the pixelled delights of computer programmers' creations. [7] William Bogard (1996), for example, while recognising the transparency of the virtual system (a feature which will be elaborated within this paper), contends that the ‘operator too’ disappears, giving ‘way to the disembodied traveller, the astral projectionist, the “interface, data cowboy” in cyberspace’ (p.37). 







PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE MALLEABILITY OF THE BODY IMAGE


Phenomenology, as a descriptive technique of subjective experience, and with a fundamental concern with perception and bodily activity (Ihde, 1990), enables us to explore phenomena as they are lived and experienced (Ronald Valle and Mark King, 1978). Allied to the existentialism [9] of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology has proved to be a method well suited to exploring the experience of being embodied (embodiment).

Framing the body, quite literally, in terms of its 'sensorial architecture' (David Tomas, 1989), or its structures of corporeality – that is, the sensorial/perceptual experiences arising from the body - has been a useful method of understanding how an individual comes to 'know' the boundaries of their body. Therefore, discussions of how we experience the body focus on sensation and function (control of our bodies) (see Rom Harre, 1991, for example). Visual inspection of our bodies contributes to our experience of a bounded body. However, our bodies are also enveloped by skin, providing us with a sentient and dimensional bodyscape. Didier Anzieu (1989) extols all the virtues of the skin with a fervour that most reserve for sight, [10] noting that it comprises ‘several sense organs’ (touch, pressure, pain and heat) and is closely entwined with our other senses of hearing, sight, smell, and taste as well as an awareness of body movement and balance. In addition, Anzieu comments on how the skin also remains continually open to the world in a manner different to the other senses: the eyes can be closed, the ears and nose 'stopped up', but the skin 'cannot reject any vibro-tactile or electro-tactile sign' (p.14-15).
We are able to move our limbs and twist our torsos, providing ourselves with a stream of proprioceptive feedback (tacit knowledge of the movements and placement of the body and its parts extended in space). In fact the body occupies many phenomenal spaces. James Anthony (1968) discusses the various body spaces which arise out of different activities: there is 'a mouth space, a visual space, an auditory space, a tactile space, [and] postural and kinaesthetic spaces' (p.1108). Anthony’s observations can be seen as characteristics of phenomenal embodiment. Our interactions of body and world (Merleau-Ponty's 'being-in-the-world') animate these different spaces effortlessly on our part. At times these spaces shout out their existence: for example, John and Marcia Goin (1981) talk of how at the dentist's we 'suddenly become all mouth' (p.62). 

However, these markers of corporeality are artificially divided here. In fact they all form a synthesis of mutually complementary body experience. Only when the body breaks down do these corporeal threads unravel: consider the person with paralysis who has visual confirmation of their body, but no tactile or proprioceptive knowledge (Robert Trieschmann, 1988). Such corporeal experience provides us with a 'body image', a phenomenological understanding of our bodies extended in space and time. [11] The term ‘body image’ has been much used by different theorists to denote different things. In psychological interpretations it has been used to denote ‘knowledge’ of one’s own body, present at the borders of consciousness, or functioning unconsciously (Douwe Tiemersma, 1989). In employing the term in a phenomenological context I, much like Merleau-Ponty, [12] use it to refer to an immediate knowledge (impression) of my body as it juts into the fabric of experiential space and time. For this reason, we cannot speak of the phenomenological body image as a stable entity: the term is a schematic way of talking about the behavioural bonds between body and world (Donald Moss, 1978).

The historical opposition of mind and body, Descarte’s dualism, has an incomplete phenomenological basis (in Drew Leder’s (1990) terms, a ‘proto-phenomenology’) We neglect the body at the times when it recedes from awareness, which is most of the time. Only with various forms of corporeal breakdown do we pay attention to the body, and at these times the body appears ‘other’. Cartesian dualism is built on this selected reflection of the body. A more disciplined phenomenology reveals that the body in the world is both foreground and background. It constitutes our locus, so that we are ‘here’ rather than ‘there’. Yet, at the same time, the body recedes from conscious reflection. At once an holistic sense organ, and yet an assemblage of sense apparatus, the body recedes from awareness in its perceptual activity. It is the very disclosure of the world that the sense organs provide which leads to their mindful demise. The body recedes in activity but is always implicitly present and known: For instance, ‘To see something as reachable and thereby open to my use is to implicitly experience my body’s capacity of reach’ (Leder, 1990: p.22). In Leder’s (1990) words, ‘My body is always a field of immediately lived sensation... It’s presence is fleshed out by a ceaseless stream of kinaesthesias, cutaneous and visceral sensations, defining my body’s space and extension and yielding information about position, [and] balance...’. However, while the ‘rim of felt embodiment’ is sketched out by how our bodies ‘feel’, it is refined by engagement in practical activities (Harre, 1991: p.20-21).





A PHENOMENOLOGY OF EMBODIMENT IN VIRTUAL REALITY


A sense of ‘presence’, of feeling ‘there’ in virtual environment’s is, perhaps, the ultimate aim of VR research. [15] This calls for a dampening of awareness in ‘reality’ and a heightened ‘acceptance’ of the surrounding virtuality. The hardware of VR must recede and become transparent for this sense of presence (or ‘telepresence’ - the experience of being fully present within the computer-generated simulation) to occur. As Mark Lajoie (1996) notes ‘To the extent that the terminal, as an interface, acts as an object, it is a constant reminder to the user of their inability to become fully subject in the virtual space. In effect, it marks their lack of presence as subject within the virtual reality’ (p.163).

One line of argument proposed is that for a sense of presence in the virtual environment of the computer, then the virtual body must closely resemble (both visually and sensorially) the body of the user. Some ask how the geometric mappings of the body within the virtual and physical environments, relative to each other, contribute to a sense of presence [16]. The general consensus is that identification, and therefore telepresence, would be increased by a similarity in the visual appearance of the user and the virtual body [17] (which can be contrasted with the speculative discourse on the polymorphous potentiality of VR, discussed later). 

As an example of how VR technology is progressing in its attempts to intentionally incorporate the user's body we can consider the work of Mel Slater and Martin Usoh (1994). Slater and Usoh provided an experimental group with a (visually) entire virtual body representation. [18] The directly manipulable components of the virtual body consisted of a representation of their right hand attached to an arm that could be bent and twisted in response to similar movements of the real arm and wrist. When participants turned their real head around by more than 60 degrees, then the virtual body turned appropriately. Slater and Usoh (1994) argue that a high correspondence between proprioception of the physical body and other (namely visual) sensory data of the virtual body make it more likely that a VR user will identify with the virtual body, and experience a greater sense of presence in the virtual environment. 
To illuminate our understanding of presence in virtual environments we need to return to the experience of embodiment. The perceptual effect that VR has on the experience of the body is little understood or explored. [19] In order to fully understand how a user experiences the body in VR, in order to identify the 'phenomenological dimensions of the technologically mediated body' (Balsamo, 1993), we need to build up a rich phenomenology of user embodiment. This can come through a detailed, qualitative analysis of user's accounts of their immersion; through a thorough exploration of our own VR encounters; and through observation of cybernauts at 'play'. 

At a recent conference on VR in the UK I tried perhaps one of the most ubiquitous forms of VR technology. My eyes 'entered' the virtual environment by means of a fairly light head mounted display (HMD), and movement was achieved by pressing my thumb on a hand held navigator. My perception of 'travel' through this virtual environment vacillated between moving outwards with some velocity, to pulling in the environment towards 'me'. However, what of my body in this experience? My legs, it might be argued, were not needed - my hand gripped the navigator with assuring firmness as my thumb toyed with the forward-backward power of the smooth button. However, it was my legs which gave me my height in this world. [20] My head movements directed my gaze. And the proprioceptive frame of my body, in which I was tacitly aware of the movement and position of my body and its parts, gave me a depth in this virtual world that a 'disembodied gaze' should not allow. [21]

In her essay, 'The Virtual body in Cyberspace', Anne Balsamo (1993), prompted by her own 'trip’, considers embodiment in VR systems. The cyberspace experience, argues Balsamo, necessitates the wilful repression of the body. The ‘disembodied gaze’ of most VR applications mime the disembodied camera eye of film: in both the point of view (pov) approximates the height of an embodied eye. Movement of perspective is simulated by the camera with rarely any overt (visual) reference to the body - in this sense the body of the eye is repressed. In such applications ‘“the body,” as a sense apparatus is nothing more than excess baggage for the cyberspace traveller.’ (p.126). This is not to say that Balsamo sees VR as a disembodying medium: she recognises that the virtual experience ‘makes sense’ because of an eye-level perspective which changes with a turn of the head. In our everyday experience the body is the ‘surpassed’ but ever present (Sartre 1970). In VR, when the body of the user is not (re)presented the body-as-surpassed takes on increased significance for embodied experience. For, whereas in the physical environment the body ‘withdraws’ from (thematised) perceptual awareness, in VR its disappearance is manufactured in one mode of bodily knowledge - that is, visually. This is a poor method of eliminating the body; the body, in its kinaesthetic and proprioceptive modes of presence continues to surface in perceptual experience - the phantom body claims its territory and demands recognition.

Michael Heim (1995), inspired by his own VR encounter, describes the perceptual nausea following virtual immersion, a ‘forewarning of...an acute form of body amnesia’ (p.67). There is a lag, Heim contends, between the cyberbody (the body which is simulated as part of the virtual environment, the virtual body) and the actual physical body as a result of sequential switching between their two domains. Heim gives anecdotal evidence from Dr. Stephen Ellis whose work with VR, apparently, has him ‘unconsciously gesturing in the primary world in ways that function in the virtual world. He points his finger half expecting to fly (as his cyberbody does under convention of the virtual world). His body needs to recalibrate to the primary world’ (p.68). [22] Heim entreats us to observe someone emerging from a VR system: ‘Watch their first hand movements. Invariably, the user stands in place a few moments..., takes in the surroundings, and then pats torso and buttocks with their hands - as if to secure a firm landing and return presence in the primary body’ (p.68). [23]

Although it is argued here that the 'disembodied gaze' is experientially a misnomer in that the physical body is always (quasi)present, a case can be made for envisaging a dissolution between social and bodily space, or at least that such a distinction becomes ambiguous, problematic. Straus (1966) argues that this social space is an expansion of the ‘body scheme’ (an unconscious, pre-reflective organising principle of bodily action). [24] It belongs to the body, but not completely: ‘it is not an indisputable property but a variable possession’. This ‘intervening space is a medium between me and the world’, and that is its social significance (p.153). Ihde (1990) notes that what we take as our ‘real’ or ‘naked’ bodily space is transformed through optical technologies such as the microscope and eyeglasses. ‘The transformation of vision through lenses changes, however slightly, our sense of bodily space. What was farther is now nearer; and when motility is involved, this calls for a new adjustment’ (p.48). VR as a predominantly optical technology has the same and additional properties as those of the traditional lens technologies. Along with the ability to move forever forward (magnify) and backwards (miniaturise) in relation to an image in VR will also come a transformation of our ‘naked’ space - particularly when we do not have a virtual body (re)presentation.  

The transparency of visual, kinaesthetic, aural and other displays are considered a key determinant of feeling present in a virtual environment. However, Penny (1994) argues that, even with smaller, less cumbersome peripherals, the fact of their attachment to the ‘outside of the body’ creates a ‘dislocation’ between the virtual body and the corporeal body. I would like to turn my attention to this point. The continuity of the-body-as-I in VR calls for an assimilation of both technological peripherals and the virtual (re)presentation. [25] In the case of VR peripherals such as HMD, gloves, and body suits, we can illuminate this process by way of recourse to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.

In Martin Heidegger’s (1962) analysis of tool use, he uses the example of a hammer. For a tool to be ready-to-hand it must, in Heidegger’s terms, ‘withdraw’. In so doing, the tool becomes the means rather than the object of the experience (Ihde, 1990). This has a parallel with the experience of the body itself: Sartre (1970) sees the body as the perpetually ‘surpassed’ (p.233).The tool itself is also surpassed as it withdraws into the architecture of the body, forming what Ihde (1990) terms ‘an embodiment relation’.

Merleau-Ponty (1970) invokes the example of the blind person’s cane. The cane for the blind person is no longer an object, but an extension of the realm of the senses. [26] With the cane as a ‘familiar instrument’, touch is experienced at its end point (‘its point has become an area of sensitivity’ (p.143)) - rather than at the hand. This body familiarity (or ‘habit’) of the tool is the result of being ‘transplanted into them, or conversely to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body’ (p.143). The incorporation of the tool into the body gestalt is what Leder (1990: p.34; see also Elizabeth Grosz, 1994) refers to as a ‘phenomenological osmosis’, ‘the body allows instruments to melt into it’ (Nebojsa Kujundzic and William Buschert, 1994: pp.207-208).

We can further illuminate our understanding of the above with Ihde’s phenomenology of technics.[27] Ihde employs the example of eyeglasses, and expresses the optically mediated world when wearing them with his triptych separation of ‘I-glasses-world’. However, in wearing eyeglasses, the glass is ‘transparent’. The weight of the glasses on the ears and the bridge of the nose also ‘withdraws’. In so far as we take technologies into our experiencing by perceiving through them, the technology becomes embodied. ‘I-glasses-world’ becomes ‘(I-glasses)-world’. Ihde maintains that the same process occurs for the hearing aid (for hearing) and the blind person’s cane (for tactile motility).   






ATYPICAL AND DISRUPTED BODIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE (RE)DESIGN OF THE BODY IN VIRTUAL REALITY









LIMB ABSENCE AND PROSTHESIS USE


With amputation the person loses one of their ‘conceptual links to the world, an anchor of his very existence’ (Robert Murphy, 1987: p.85). In objective terms, the amputee loses all modes of bodily knowledge about their lost limb. In the amputee’s ‘reality’ this is not the case as phantom phenomena permeates their experience. Typically amputees report feeling as if their amputated limb is 'still there'. The phantom may be experienced as painful, intermittent, and locked in the same position (which may match the limb's pre-amputation position, particularly in the case of trauma). Conversely, the phantom may not be painful, enduring, and capable of 'movement' (sometimes under the amputee's conscious control). Any combination of these phenomena might characterise a particular amputee’s experience. 

My recent research has centred upon the phenomenological boundaries of prosthesis user’s bodies. Both people with acquired amputations and people with congenital limb absence will be encouraged to use prostheses. In addition to a frequently expressed emotional attachment to an artificial limb, users often report that the limb feels ‘part of’ them. As an example of this consider the following excerpt from an interview with a female with a lower-limb amputation: 

‘...many amputees feel that their artificial limb is somehow part of them, a simple example of this is that I wouldn’t like just anyone putting their hand on my knee, even though it is not actually part of my body’s flesh, it is still mine even though it’s a piece of plastic and metal.’ 
Another interviewee, a female with congenital absence of her right forearm, told me 

‘...it’s [the prosthesis] a part of me now, that’s the only way I can describe it. To me it’s as if, though I’ve not got my lower arm, it’s as though I’ve got it and it’s a part of me now. It’s as though I’ve got two hands, two arms.’ 








Paralysis is a condition that involves the loss of multiple modes of knowledge about the body (e.g. tactile and proprioceptive). Robert Murphy (1987:85) wrote about his own experience of quadriplegia in The Body Silent:


...I no longer know where my feet are, and without the low-level pain I still feel, I would hardly know I had legs. ...I have ...become emotionally detached from my body, often referring to one of my limbs as the leg or the arm. ...My solution to this dilemma is radical dissociation from the body, a kind of etherialization of identity.

Trieschmann (1988) relates how some spinal cord injury patients (particularly those with quadriplegia) describe their embodiment as a sensation of 'feeling like a balloon floating in space' (p.61), they have no ‘perceptible ties’ to the ground. When one considers that these patients have sensation from the neck and head only, the metaphor speaks a phenomenological truth. The rest of the insentient body has only a visual life for such patients. 






Plastic surgery is generally perceived as a practice or discipline of aesthetics. In the context of this paper I would like to discuss plastic surgery (cosmetic and corrective) as a technology of embodiment, for the changes it exerts upon a person’s felt corporeality. The most obvious feature of plastic surgery (to the gaze of the other) is a change in appearance. However, for the embodied patient/customer there are also sensory changes (of which their own visual inspection will be one). In contrast to the body observed in the mirror, the observable result of surgery, there are more subjective changes of embodiment (such as changes in tactility and proprioception) which are experienced-as-being, rather than just observed. In the examples of breast augmentation and reduction, there may be reduced tactile sensations ('crude touch, and light pressure sensation' (Eugene Courtiss and Robert Goldwyn (1976)), diminished pain perception (Thomas Pruzinsky and Mark Edgerton, 1990), and subjective changes in the position, weight, and form of the breasts (Goin et al., 1977). One woman, who had a breast reduction, is reported to have found difficulty in locating itching areas of her breasts: ‘what used to be in one place is now in another’ (Goin and Goin, 1981: p.206).

It has been noted that sensory changes accompany 'virtually all types of cosmetic surgery' (Pruzinsky and Edgerton, 1990: p.221). In eyelid surgery (a technique employed by some to 'remove' ethnicity) their may be an increase in the scope of sight; operations on the nose may result in permanent changes of respiratory sensations (Pruzinsky and Edgerton, 1990). The ubiquitous face-lift operation results in a hyperthesia of the skin on the face and neck which blurs the 'self-nonself boundary' where patients may experience a 'loss of "boundary sensations" when sleeping with their partially numb faces against the pillow' (Goin and Goin, 1981: p.146). 

These changes in embodiment can lead to a dissociation from the body. A 'loss of identity' (Pruzinsky and Edgerton, 1990: p.232) has been associated with both cosmetic and corrective plastic surgery which may be short or long term. The sensory changes which accompany a change in the topography of the body take time to weave their way into the body image of the patient. We can consider the examples provided by Richard Druss (1973), who underwent breast augmentations. Typically, these patients examined their breasts visually and tactually in a 'exploration of the[ir] newly altered body contour' (Goin and Goin, 1981). We can look upon this as a sensory convergence, a unification and continued integration of the senses in the phenomenological body image.  

In direct relation to VR, we can see that the explosion of sensory information that comes with plastic surgery (and with amputation too) takes time to crystallise into a concise body psyche, whereupon a sense of completeness allows a reliable body image once more. The dizzying sensory changes which will accompany VR experiences will likewise disorient our ‘sense of body’ before, with exploration and time, a coherent body is experienced. In the later sections of this paper we will see how the key phenomena of phantom limb (as experienced by the amputee) and the dissociation with or objectification of the body (as experienced by the paralytic) are manifested in current VR applications. 

THE BODY IMAGE, THE PROSTHETIC, AND THE PHANTOM


Merleau-Ponty (1970) understands the phantom limb phenomena as a result of 'being-in-the-world'. For an amputee to have phantom phenomena is to 'remain open' to a customary world, and to 'retain the practical field which one enjoyed before mutilation' (pp.81-82). The customary world continues to elicit habitual intentions (lost capabilities). The amputee is torn between two bodies - the customary or habitual body, and the 'body at this moment', body reality. For Merleau-Ponty, 'the problem how I [the amputee] can have the sensation of still possessing a limb which I no longer have amounts to finding out how the habitual body can act as guarantee for the body at this moment' (p.82). In the case of the amputee who employs a prosthesis, the habitual body is buttressed by an effective combination of the artificial and phantastic: the prosthetically enhanced body-at-this-moment acts as guarantee for the habitual body. We can consider this phenomena with regards to one amputee who told me: 'I have always worn a prosthetic for all my waking hours unless I was injured. I feel connected to the ground much like I do with my real foot, maybe this is because of phantom limb experience'. Here we see the prosthetic and phantom limb phenomena entwining their different properties (the 'legness' of the phantom, the solidity and 'reality' of the prosthetic) which anchors (a 'connectedness-to-the ground') the amputee to their habitual world.

The visual aesthetic, the change in physical appearance, is just one aspect of the improvement which breast reconstruction with prosthetic implants have for some women. Changes in proprioception, and tactility are intimately experienced-as-being, possibly more compelling than the optic sense, and ever-present. The contribution a phantom can make to the acceptance of prosthetic breast implants is evidenced by one women who, one and a half years after her mastectomy, was still experiencing phantom breast sensations and ‘immediately experienced the implants as being her own breasts’ (Goin and Goin, 1981: p.185).





THE PHANTOM AND OBJECTIFIED BODY IN VR


In ancient Egypt the word 'ka' referred to an 'ethereal and less dense' copy of the human body. This 'invisible but still material analogue' of the soul 'inhabited and animated' the physical body (Grosz, 1989: p.62-63). Such a cultural myth echoes the state of the body in current virtual reality systems: we might consider that the dense human body inhabits an ethereal virtual one, [31] or that the physical body becomes more ethereal (less tangible) in the virtual experience while perceptually and experientially the virtual body becomes more dense. Heim (1995) implies much the same thing when he says that ‘...HMD [head-mounted display] immersion results from the primary body giving away priority to the cyberbody... The user undergoes a high-powered interiorization of a virtual environment but in the process loses self-awareness’(p.72). [32] This is a question of phenomenal embodiment in VR systems: our technological embodiment may vacillate between the two: but two there are. This is what Simon Penny (1994: p.242) calls the 'split body condition' or the 'double body'. In VR, part of the sensorial architecture of the body remains in the physical world, while another is projected into the virtual one. The corporeal body in the physical environment remains ever present to mind, while an 'electronic "body image"' weakly echoes and competes with it. When only part(s) of the body are absorbed by VR technology, phantom phenomena will occur. The degree to which our visual corporeality dominates our embodied experience will influence the tangibility of our remaining body outside the VR experience. 

I want to explore some of the phenomena of amputees' and paralytics’ experience of body in relation to embodiment in VR technologies. As an example of the informative value of atypical embodiment when applied to VR, it is useful to consider some of the findings of Slater and Usoh (1994). The range of movement offered by the virtual body in the studies reported here was limited. Following a pilot study (in which only one arm and gross torso movements were represented) some participants commented that their virtual body was 'a dead weight', 'a useless thing', and 'nothing to do with me' (p.134). Slater and Usoh (1994) provide their own analogy of this phenomena. They use an example of atypical embodiment, namely the loss of proprioception, to inform us about the participants’ behaviour. The example is drawn from Oliver Sacks' (1985) essay 'The Disembodied Lady'. Sacks writes of Christina who lost all sense of her muscle, tendon and joint positions. By her own account, Christina couldn't 'feel' her body, she felt 'disembodied'. Only by careful (visual) observation of her movements could Christina accomplish motor tasks. [33] Without this close scrutiny her body was 'blind' to itself': she would 'lose' her arms for instance, 'I think they're one place, and I find they're another' (p.46).  

However, the responses from the participants in Slater’s and Usoh’s studies are remarkably similar to the comments made by people with paralysis of various parts of their bodies. In both cases a dissociation with or an objectification of the body (or its parts) is articulated. The dissociation that Murphy (discussed earlier) experienced with regards to his body is similar to that experienced by some participants in Slater and Usoh's studies. We can relate the objectification of these bodies [34] to their lack of movement and direct sensation. However, this is only part of the story. While Murphy demonstrated a lack of movement and sensation from his body, 'inhabitants' of current virtual bodies do have their physicality to fall back on. For instance, Slater and Usoh comment that 'one subject on noticing the fixed virtual left arm began to move her real left arm very rapidly, in a manner indicating panic', while another related that 'I thought there was really something wrong with my [left] arm' (p.133). One reading of these comments is that participants experienced the contradiction between their virtual and physical bodies as phantom phenomena  (a feature of the amputee's experience). While they experienced a kind of paralysis in the virtual environment, they also experienced a moveable body in the 'primary world' (Heim, 1995). Such an interpretation would also appear to explain another comment made by a participant in relation to 'walking' in the virtual environment: 'Sometimes [I had] a desperate need to actually walk when virtually walking, there does seem to be a conflict between what the eyes see and the body feels - e.g. my feet appear to be floating but I can feel my feet on the ground' (Slater and Usoh, 1994: p.135).





(RE)DESIGN AND (RE)PRESENTATION OF THE BODY: 
SPECULATIVE DISCOURSE ON POLYMORPHOUS VIRTUAL REALITY


There is a recurring line of speculative virtual reality discourse that argues future developments of these technologies will fulfil what Balsamo (1993) calls ‘a utopian desire for control over the form of personal embodiment.’ Lajoie (1996) tells us that ‘The matrix... promises to do two things, one of which is to completely effect our body and the space in which it is located, and second, to inscribe subjectivity within a computer-generated phenomenal space, a space in which all desires can be fulfilled’ (pp.162-163). There is a sense in which the computer programmer or VR designer can be envisaged as wielding a scalpel on the virtual body of the user. As with plastic surgery, VR is a technology of embodiment, manipulating the corporeal structures of experience (and the experience of corporeal structures). 

Fisher (1992) talks of the ability of VR to allow users to be represented by any chosen form (‘a kind of electronic persona’). Bukatman (1993) recognises the simulated, but powerful, polymorphism that is at work in such applications. ‘To be installed into such an apparatus would be to exist on two planes at once: while one’s objective body would remain in the real world, one’s phenomenal body would be projected into the terminal reality’ (Bukatman, 1993). 

Such polymorphic experiments have been conducted by Jaron Lanier and colleagues, where the relationship between bodily movement and sensory feedback were reorganised, and have been reported by Biocca and Levy (1995) and Penny (1994). Here, body parts were presented in different proportions in the virtual world for perceptual effect. Lanier himself comments on the ‘slippery’ distinction between the body and the world in VR: He asks ‘How are you connected to the world? What if your eyes were on your fingers? ...What if you took all the measurements and the movements of your physical body and somehow put them through a mathematical function that allowed you to control six arms at once with practice’ (Biocca and Lanier, 1992: p.158). 

This transfiguration of corporeality discourse is further applied to people with disabilities. So, for instance, someone with paralysis, it is argued, would be able to employ ‘sip and puff’ control strategies for their virtual limbs. The premise is that as (re)presentation in virtual environment’s is digital, we will be able to ‘define ourselves’ as anyone or anything. Quadriplegics will walk - or better still, be Olympic athletes (Jerry Fodor, 1994). In fact the peripheral input/output devices so characteristic of VR become, in this speculative discourse, the means of abolishing or creating disability. The distinction between able and disabled ‘disappears’: ‘In Virtual Reality everyone is disabled to the extent that we cannot participate without “assistive devices”, and on the other hand, there need be no limit to what we can accomplish with them’ (Ann Lasko-Harvill, 1993: p.61). 

The issue that statements such as these raise is whether such control strategies will allow a user to experience these virtual limbs as part of their phenomenal bodies. Penny (1994) talks of designer reality where we will be able to choose the morphology and style of our bodies. Here, the morphology of the body may be manipulated as additional sensors are employed to animate extra limbs. Penny tells us that ‘The mind maps to this new body almost effortlessly.’ Jaron Lanier’s report that it only takes a matter of minutes to adjust to arbitrarily placed sensors as controllers for extra limbs are seized upon by Penny to suggest that the mind can quickly draw a new internal body representation to allow control of the new body. Ease of control here is (erroneously I believe) being held as evidence for ‘habitation’ of a new body. Many amputees who I have interviewed are adept users of their prosthetic technology, but still some of them insist on the ‘otherness’ of these limbs. From the experience of amputees, paralytics, and recipients of plastic surgery, I would argue that sensory changes in the architecture of the body take time to weave into an altered body image; VR applications do not appear to be an exception to this. A literary example helps provides us with an idea of the phenomenology of a radically refigured body in VR: 
'As Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from uneasy dreams he found himself transformed in his bed into a gigantic insect. He was lying on his hard, as it were armour-plated, back and when he lifted his head a little could see his dome-like brown belly divided into stiff arched segments on top of which the bed-quilt could hardly keep in position and was about to slide off completely. His numerous legs, which were pitifully thin compared to the rest of his bulk, waved helplessly before his eyes' (Franz Kafka, 1967). 

For Gregor Samsa, the legs had become, in Plugge’s (1970) characterisation of the infant’s experience, ‘strange and distant things’ once more. To be ‘installed’ in a radically reconfigured body in VR would, at least initially, be a similar experience.  







Within this paper I have attempted to address and elaborate the phenomenology of the body in immersive virtual reality (VR) systems. This has involved a discussion of VR’s predominantly optical nature and a critique of the dualism that pervades current accounts of VR. Throughout this paper I have attempted to explore the core aspects of embodiment and how they apply in VR applications. Here, various embodiment theorists have been drawn upon to demonstrate our lived, sentient knowledge of our bodies extended in space and time (the ‘phenomenological body image’). Along with a consideration of atypical or disrupted bodies (limb absence, paralysis, plastic surgery), this has enabled a consideration of the phenomenological experience of embodiment in current and (possible) future virtual reality applications. Informative comparisons of phenomena associated with such disrupted bodies (phantom limb, dissociation of the ‘self’ from the body) to the experience of the body in VR (the phantom and objectified bodies in current VR applications) have been made. 















(1) The evolution of this development has progressed from no representation, to an arrow (as hand), to the hand, and finally ‘full body’ representations. However, all of these forms exist and continue to be developed. A decision on whether to include a body representation will often be made on it’s perceived desirability for the particular application in question.

(2) 'Intentionality' derives from the Latin 'intendere' meaning 'to stretch forth'. As employed in phenomenology, 'intentionality' refers to the reaching out of the mind to phenomenal reality, whereby we experience an intentionally interpreted world (Ernesto Spinelli, 1995). 

(3) Hans Jonas (1970) presents a phenomenology of the senses in his essay in which he finds 'the ancient claims for sight substantiated and at the same time qualified' (p.313). He recognises that though a very special sense, sight is incomplete by itself. Jonas highlights hearing and touch as two senses that complement and help sight achieve its full potential. In fact Jonas contends that 'in his hand man possesses a tactile organ which can take over some of the distinctive achievements of his eye' (p.318). For Jonas, sight and touch are two organs of a more general faculty of 'vision'. Kurt Kaczmarek and Paul Bach-Y-Rita (1995) also note that 'The skin shows a number of functional similarities to the retina of the eye in its capacity to mediate information' (p.349).

(4) The history of VR has been to ‘input’ the eyes, then the hand, while the rest of the body’s sensorium and motorium has been neglected or considered peripheral to the immediate aims of VR. Our evolutionary history includes the development of an upright posture, along with which ‘the hand’ has become ‘an organ of active gnostic touching - the epicritic, discriminative instrument par excellence’ (Straus, 1966: p.150). In some forms of ‘bodyless’ VR, the properties of the eye (via a head-mounted display) and hand (via a disembodied representation of the hand) are combined to form one synergistic tool for activity in VE’s. Given that we can characterise, as Jonas does, sight and touch as two organs of a general faculty of ‘vision’, this development might not be considered surprising. A more erotic explanation is provided by Marcus Novak (1992), who argues that ‘[t]he course of invention has been to follow desire, with its access to the parts of our bodies that have most nerve ending. When we enter cyberspace we will expect to feel the mass of our bodies, the reluctance of our skeleton; but we will choose to control with our eyes, fingertips, lip, and tongues, even genitals’ (p.241).

(5) It is interesting to compare embodiment under conditions of sensory deprivation with immersion in VR. Seymour Fisher (1973) gives the example of a sensory deprivation study carried out by the psychiatrist, John C. Lilly. Lilly submerged himself in a tank of water, the temperature of which matched his body. As he floated in the tank with all light and sound excluded (‘blocked’), Lilly began to feel ‘merged and indistinguishable from all that surrounded him’, ‘he could not distinguish where his body left off and the water began...’ (p.22). With no sensory detail (including diminished proprioceptive and kinaesthetic frames of reference), Lilly’s body boundaries became ambiguous. Even the temperature of his body no longer ‘framed’ his body against the surrounding environmental temperature. The condition in VR is (partial) substitution of sensory information, though a deprivation (of physical reality), as articulated by Biocca and Levy, is an integral part of a ‘compelling’ VR experience (particularly when the body is to be ‘re-morphed’).  

(6) This is a characteristic of optical technologies, a proto-phenomenology or selective reflection on embodiment facilitates such Cartesian readings. For instance, Robert Romanyshyn (1994) reflects this when he talks about the telescope: ‘In 1609 Galileo’s telescopic eye danced on the moon. Aided by this newly invented instrument of the telescope, Galileo took another step in the development of a kind of consciousness that required him to organise his experience and to make sense of the world by leaving the body behind.’ In a richer phenomenology, Sartre (1970) identifies the body as a whole, as a locus of being, as that which ‘extends across the tool it utilises: ...it is at the end of the telescope which shows me the stars...’ (p.232, italics mine).
 
(7) In another dualistic twist, ‘we’ are the mind to our cyberbody which will perish while the cyberbody is ‘immortal’ (Novak, 1992). 

(8) See Katherine Hayles (1996). 

(9) The etymology of 'existentialism' (or 'existence') derives from the Latin verb 'existere', 'meaning to stand out, or to become, to emerge' (Henryk Misiak and Virginia Sexton, 1973:72). Applied specifically to the phenomenal experience of the body, 'to stand out' has increased significance; though world and self are intimately related our bodies (as the locus of self) are the foreground of our existence.  

(10) 'Of all the sense organs...' argues Anzieu, '[the skin] is the most vital: one can live without sight, hearing, taste or smell, but it is impossible to survive if the greater part of one's skin is not intact. The skin... occupies a greater surface (...18,000 [square centimetres] in the adult) than any other sense organ. ...' (p.14).

(11) Merleau-Ponty (1970), stressing the experiential nature of space and time, cautions 'We must avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. It inhabits space and time' (p.139). 

(12) Merleau-Ponty tells us that ‘...my body for me is not an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space. I am in undivided possession of it and know where each of my limbs is through a body image in which all are included.’ (p.98). As an example of the immediacy of the body image extended in space (‘a spatiality of situation’), he continues, ‘If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are stressed and the whole of my body trails behind them like the tail of a comet. It is not that I am unaware of my shoulders or back, but these are simply swallowed up in the position of my hands, and my whole posture can be read so to speak in the pressure they exert on the table.’ (p.100).

(13) For instance, Straus (1966) notes that the development of bipedality in humans brought with it a ‘transition of sensorium and motorium, of periphery and centre, of form and function’ (p.164). As well as the implications for perception, there are accompanying changes in the structure of thought itself.  Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1988) contends that our bodies have served as semantic templates throughout our evolutionary history. Our concepts of hardness and number, for example, are said to have arisen through the lived body (hardness of teeth, the binary rhythm of walking). 

(14) This is Maus’ term and is most appropriately, for the theme of this paper, demonstrated in ‘techniques of activity, of movement’ (such as walking, running, jumping and climbing) (Maus, 1992: p.469) which are taught and culturally transmitted. 

(15) Although, arguably, ‘photo-realism’ (intimately related to the quest for ‘presence’) may be the holy grail for some computer scientists.
(16) Thomas Sheridan (1992)

(17) Richard Held and Nat Durlach (1992) were primarily talking about teleoperator systems (controlling remote devices/robots), although they apply their analysis to virtual environments. Jack Loomis (1992), too, notes that when highly anthropomorphic designs are employed in teleoperator systems (torso, limbs, video and auditory displays) a compelling impression of  telepresence is often reported by the users.

(18) ‘The VB [virtual body] used in these experiments was a crude polygonal representation of a real human body' (Woodrow Barfield et al., 1995: p.506). 

(19) A notable exception is a study reported by Giuseppe Riva (1998) who attempted to look at the effects of an immersive virtual environment on body experience, and claimed to have found that even a short-term immersion in the virtual environment is able to modify the perceptual/cognitive contents of the body image. The representation of participants in this environment was a solitary virtual hand. The methodology employed in this study involved questionnaires to ‘measure’ changes in participant’s body images, but the participants verbal accounts of their experiences of corporeality in this environment was not explored. Riva also cites a study by Cioffi (1993) which reported that subjects felt as if they had dematerialised or were ‘in the absence of gravity’. In addition high numbers of participants claimed not to feel their bodies.

(20) Dennis Proffitt explains that the ‘point of projection’ in VR is at standing height. The perspective offered to the viewer mimics their experience in the world, and they measure objects in the VE as they do in ‘reality’, that is against their own bodies. ‘You turn your head and see a stool in the corner, it appears below your line of vision, making it appear shorter than you are’ (Beth Azar, 1996[a]: pp.1, 25).  

(21) The supporting role of the whole body in any perceptual activity is elaborated on by Leder (1990): ‘When I gaze at a landscape I dwell most fully in the eyes. Yet this is only possible because my back muscles hold my spine erect, my neck muscles adjust my head into the proper position for viewing. ...My whole body provides the background that supports and enables the point of corporeal focus. As such, the body itself is not a point but an organised field in which certain organs and abilities come to prominence while others recede’. 

(22) Apart from ‘motion sickness’, other ‘after-effects include flashbacks, illusory sensations of climbing and turning, and reduced motor control’ have ‘been documented as lasting up to two weeks’ (Azar, 1996[b]: p.25). 

(23) The assuring pats on the buttocks and torso that Heim observes in ‘emerging’ VR users is reminiscent of behaviour observed in some schizophrenics and psychotics who express their reasons for caressing, cutting, or banging various parts of the body as a wish to ‘regain a clear picture of the dimensionality of their bodies, which had become vague or “deadened”’ (Fisher, 1973: p.23-24).
 
(24) Henry Head (1920) posited the body scheme, a plastic neural representation of the body, to explain how postural adjustments and the localization of bodily sensations are achieved. The body schema is dynamic, being constantly restructured by the acquisition of new skills and movements. It is presupposed in the awareness and movement of the body (Tiemersma 1989), enabling the functional distinction between corporeal and extracorporeal space. As such, the body scheme provides the basis for meaningful action within the environment. Head famously stated that the body scheme extended to the tip of the feather in a woman’s hat (Head and Holmes 1911). The body scheme, then, enables the projection of ‘our recognition of posture, movement, and locality beyond the limits of our bodies to the end of some instrument held in the hand’ (ibid). Without it we would be unable to carry out even seemingly mundane tasks, such as feeding ourselves with a knife and fork.

(25) There is also a sense whereby ‘donning’ HMD’s, gloves and  body suits becomes a ritual. In order to ‘enter’ the virtual world these devices have to be worn, both literally and symbolically. For example, consider a study by Mel Slater, Martin Usoh, and Anthony Steed (1994) where a greater sense of ‘presence’ was induced by having participants simulate the process of entering the virtual environment while already immersed in a VE. This simulation included repetition of ‘donning’ a virtual HMD to enter different virtual environments. 

(26) Indeed, Merleau-Ponty (1970) speaks of the blind man’s cane as ‘an instrument with which he perceives. It is a bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis’ (p.152). Similarly, Leder (1990) contends that ‘In its use of tools and machines the body supplements itself through annexing artificial organs’ (p.30).

(27) Ihde defines ‘technics’ as ‘the symbiosis of artefact and user within a human action’ (p.73).
(28) For instance, Rupert England (1995) makes the point that protective clothing impinges on certain tasks (e.g. thick gloves prevent, or hinder, fine manipulations) in the real environment. Therefore, VR peripherals should be built into the task, environment, and virtual body of the user. A 3-d mouse for instance (a piece of wired apparatus equipped with buttons which facilitate movement within virtual environments) might take the form of a hammer in the virtual world. 

(29) This is not to say that we can’t become aware of them. Perception takes place ‘through’ the peripherals, but as a ‘fringe phenomenon’ we can become aware of, for instance, the light pressure of eyeglasses on the bridge of the nose - but the ‘focal’ phenomenon is achieved by the perceptual transparency of the peripherals. This is what Ihde (1990) refers to as a ‘ratio’ between the objectness of the technology and its transparency in use. At the extreme height of embodiment, background presence of the technology may be detected. However, this does not imply that a ‘dislocation’ will inevitably be experienced between the corporeal and the virtual body. 

 (30) This statement has at least one caveat: the prosthesis user may reach this type of incorporation after only many years of use, if at all. I am currently researching the circumstances surrounding this incorporation of the prosthesis into the phenomenal boundaries of a user’s body. However, there is some indication, as discussed later, that it is possible to manipulate the physical body and (re)present these manipulations in a virtual environment.

(31) Romanyshyn (1994) argues that it is closer to the phenomenology of cyberspace experience to see the virtual or cyberbody as ‘haunting’ the virtual world. The virtual body has a ‘ghostly presence’, ‘it’s interactions with its virtual environment leave no tangible marks upon its digital flesh’. Romanyshyn’s description, I would argue, is more suited to a distanced ‘observer’ than to the ‘inhabitant’ of the virtual body.  

(32) A fictional example of this is provided by the British television sci-fi comedy, Red Dwarf. In one episode one of the main characters, Cat, attempts to leave an ‘artificial reality console’ by taking off the peripheral devices. After taking off the left glove and boot, Cat’s (virtual) body is rendered paralysed down his left-hand side. Although Cat’s physical body is ostensibly not paralysed, it is the virtual reality that remains his dominant bodily perception.  

(33) This is actually very true of tasks in VR when manipulation is required and where force-feedback is absent. 

(34) As a case of extreme objectification of the VB we can consider a participant in a study reported by Mark Draper (1995): ‘one pilot subject attempted to separate the free floating right arm from the body for use as a detached virtual ruler!’  
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